Artikel
Zimbabwe 2008: key political developments
16 oktober 2008
Zimbabwe held two critical elections in the first half of 2008, but they were sharply contrasting. The first, commonly referred to as “harmonised elections” were held on 29 March and were, in fact, four-tier elections: (1) for the executive presidency; (2) for the 210 member House of Assembly; (3) for the 60 elective seats in the 93-member Senate; and (4) for the nearly 2000 local government seats. These elections – all held in one day – were in the context of the SADC-mediated negotiations between the then ruling ZANU-PF party and the two opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations. The negotiations resulted in some important but modest changes to the electoral and political playing field. As a consequence, the March elections were easily the most peaceful (even carnival) since the start of the multi-layered crisis in 2000.
The combined opposition MDC captured a small majority in the House of Assembly and tied with ZANU-PF in the Senate. In the presidential elections, there was no outright winner but the leader of the main MDC faction Morgan Tsvangirai emerged as the frontrunner with 48 per cent of the votes, closely followed by his rival incumbent president Robert Mugabe who obtained 43 per cent of the valid votes. The law dictated a second election be held in which only the first two presidential candidates take part. The harmonised elections were judged by observers to be a comparatively free and fair expression of the genuine will of the Zimbabwe people.
While the March elections – where 43 per cent of the 5.9 million registered voters turned out to vote – were the most peaceful since 2000, the second election scheduled for 27 June, 2008 was the bloodiest since independence. This election was preceded by a number of unsavoury developments. The first signal that all was not well was when the election body – the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) – took no less than 36 hours to start publicising the parliamentary results despite the fact that these were posted at polling stations immediately after counting. Further, when the announcement of results started, it proceeded at a snail’s pace that created widespread national anxiety, frustration and even anger among highly expectant voters. In the end, it took ZEC five days to announce the results of the House of Assembly and Senate elections.
After announcing the parliamentary results, ZEC stalled and took a full month before announcing the results of the flagship presidential elections. The MDC was compelled to seek the intervention of the courts to get the all-important results released but received little redress. The regional body – SADC – was also forced to convene an emergency meeting on 12 April to deal with the unfolding electoral crisis. The Summit resolved that the presidential election results be released “expeditiously” but this had little effect on ZEC which continued with its casual approach. Instead, ZEC proceeded to order a recount of votes in 23 constituencies, a recount that did not yield any material deviations from the original results.
After much agitation and mounting pressure from domestic and international stakeholders – including court orders and a job stayaway called by the MDC and discussion of the stalemate at the United Nations – the presidential election results were finally released on 2 May. According to the law, this result necessitated a second election “within 21 days of the previous election”, which ZEC interpreted to mean “21 days after the declaration of the results”. The electoral body stalled again by not immediately announcing the date for the new poll. Meanwhile, the main opposition MDC-T rejected the results, having previously declared that its candidate won an outright majority. By the time the results were announced, Tsvangirai had already skipped the country, fearing for his life. It is clear that the 29 March harmonised elections, far from producing harmonised results, generated much disharmony, which deepened with each passing day.
The Hellish Election
Meanwhile, all hell had broken loose. Soon after the results of the parliamentary elections, the whole of Zimbabwe was engulfed in a wave of politically motivated violence whose epicentre was in the rural areas. The post-March crackdown, allegedly orchestrated and systematically executed by state security agents in collusion with ZANU-PF militia and war veterans, included, but was not limited to, murder of opposition and suspected opposition leaders, intimidation, kidnapping, torture and arson in a campaign called “Mavhotera Papi” (Who did you vote for?). This strategy was designed to ‘soften’ the electorate ahead of the 27 June run-off election. A major humanitarian crisis arose, compounding an already tragic multi-layered crisis. By the time of the run-off, at least 100 innocent lives had been lost, thousands injured and over two hundred thousand people internally displaced. This inter-election period was one of the darkest episodes in the country’s history; it was a deeply traumatising era.
The scale of the violence and intimidation compelled Tsvangirai to withdraw from the election on 22 June, leaving Mugabe to run in a one-candidate election which he ‘resoundingly’ won by 86 per cent to Tsvangirai’s 9 per cent of the votes. Mugabe was again crowned the country’s president on 29 June, a few hours after the declaration of the victory. The election was dismissed as ‘a sham’ by virtually every credible observer group, including SADC, the African Union, and the Pan-African Parliament. There was consensus that the election was a travesty of democratic practice and a pale shadow of the March elections, and that it did not express the voluntary will of the people; it was an election without a choice.
Towards a Power-sharing Agreement
Mugabe’s electoral ‘victory’ deepened the protracted crisis and the SADC, AU and United Nations were all faces with this seemingly insoluble problem. Again, the onus for unlocking the logjam was placed on former South African president Thabo Mbeki’s shoulders. After intense negotiations, the mediation efforts produced the first fruits. On 21 July 2008 three political principals namely Mugabe, Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara – representing the splinter and smaller MDC formation – signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU provided a framework for dialogue among the three protagonists “with a view to creating a genuine, viable, permanent and sustainable solution to the Zimbabwean situation”.
After several weeks of difficult negotiations, a landmark agreement was struck on 11 September and was signed – with much fanfare – on 15 September 2008. The power-sharing agreement covers a wide spectrum of policy issues ranging from restoration of economic stability and growth to promotion of national healing, rule of law, freedom of assembly and association, depoliticisation of state institutions and the crafting of a new constitution.
The actual power-sharing is embodied in a new structure of government, whereby Mugabe remains Head of State and head of a 31-member cabinet. Tsvangirai becomes Prime Minister and head of a council of ministers. Both the cabinet and the council will comprise of 15 members from ZANU-PF; 13 from MDC-Tsvangirai; and another 3 from MDC-Mutambara.
For the average Zimbabwean, the signing of the PSA raised high hopes – though not euphoria – that, finally, the national nightmare would come to an end and that life for Zimbabweans would normalise again. But at the time of writing, a month after 15 September, the Agreement has not yet taken off the ground. Clearly there appears to be deep mutual distrust among the political gladiators, and on 9 October, 2008, Tsvangirai “declared a deadlock” in the dialogue for the allocation of government portfolios. Two days later, Mugabe unilaterally apportioned the 31 ministries, reserving for his party the juiciest and most powerful – including those responsible for the military, police, security, justice and information, and giving his rivals the lightweight portfolios. This again plunged the deal to the verge of collapse, with Tsvangirai dismissing Mugabe’s cabinet allocation as a “power grabbing” decision that “not even an idiot would accept”.
In the meantime, the country’s economy continues in its precipitous freefall and people are grievously hurting. The annual inflation rate for July 2008 skyrocketed from 11.2 million per cent in June to 231 million per cent. Steve Hanke of the Cato Institute estimates that as of 26 September 2008, “Zimbabwe’s annual inflation rate was 531 billion per cent”. The country is experiencing acute shortages of foreign currency, fuel, electricity, medicines, and basic food like mealie meal, milk and bread. Some 3 million people out of a population of about 13 million are said to have fled the country, a measure of its inhabitability. About 3 million Zimbabweans also urgently need food assistance and the figure will jump to 5 million by early 2009. Anxiety and skepticism are now enveloping the country regarding the future and sustainability of the power-sharing deal. There are now many unknowns about the Agreement.
Unanswered Questions
Even if the power-sharing deal were to hold, will it pull Zimbabwe from its deep economic and social abyss? Will it be the panacea for the social, political and economic ills that have been afflicting the country for the past eight years? Further, the Agreement has been attacked for being an elite pact that serves the interests of the power elite rather than the people’s interests. Can the country, whose industry and agriculture have been brought to their knees, afford 31 ministers and 31 deputy ministers? The deal has also been condemned for undermining the will of the people as expressed on 29 March. Is the power-sharing arrangement what the people really want? Given the history of party-based polarisation, do Zimbabweans have confidence that the proposed “inclusive government” will work?
These and many others are questions that crisis-weary Zimbabweans are now asking. Only time will provide answers to these questions. For now, the political elites are fidgeting while Zimbabwe is burning. This article was written to provide background information to the Zimbabwe PIW issue Zimbabwe Election 2008: some poets’ perspectives
The year 2008 will go down as one of the most momentous in Zimbabwe’s history. It was a year of high hopes that were quickly dashed before the country descended into Hobbes’ “state of nature” where life is “solitary, nasty, brutish and short”. Three flagship political developments define Zimbabwe in 2008: the March harmonised elections; the 27 June run-off election; the inter-election violence and intimidation; and the historic power-sharing agreement signed in September 2008.
A Tale of Two ElectionsZimbabwe held two critical elections in the first half of 2008, but they were sharply contrasting. The first, commonly referred to as “harmonised elections” were held on 29 March and were, in fact, four-tier elections: (1) for the executive presidency; (2) for the 210 member House of Assembly; (3) for the 60 elective seats in the 93-member Senate; and (4) for the nearly 2000 local government seats. These elections – all held in one day – were in the context of the SADC-mediated negotiations between the then ruling ZANU-PF party and the two opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations. The negotiations resulted in some important but modest changes to the electoral and political playing field. As a consequence, the March elections were easily the most peaceful (even carnival) since the start of the multi-layered crisis in 2000.
The combined opposition MDC captured a small majority in the House of Assembly and tied with ZANU-PF in the Senate. In the presidential elections, there was no outright winner but the leader of the main MDC faction Morgan Tsvangirai emerged as the frontrunner with 48 per cent of the votes, closely followed by his rival incumbent president Robert Mugabe who obtained 43 per cent of the valid votes. The law dictated a second election be held in which only the first two presidential candidates take part. The harmonised elections were judged by observers to be a comparatively free and fair expression of the genuine will of the Zimbabwe people.
While the March elections – where 43 per cent of the 5.9 million registered voters turned out to vote – were the most peaceful since 2000, the second election scheduled for 27 June, 2008 was the bloodiest since independence. This election was preceded by a number of unsavoury developments. The first signal that all was not well was when the election body – the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) – took no less than 36 hours to start publicising the parliamentary results despite the fact that these were posted at polling stations immediately after counting. Further, when the announcement of results started, it proceeded at a snail’s pace that created widespread national anxiety, frustration and even anger among highly expectant voters. In the end, it took ZEC five days to announce the results of the House of Assembly and Senate elections.
After announcing the parliamentary results, ZEC stalled and took a full month before announcing the results of the flagship presidential elections. The MDC was compelled to seek the intervention of the courts to get the all-important results released but received little redress. The regional body – SADC – was also forced to convene an emergency meeting on 12 April to deal with the unfolding electoral crisis. The Summit resolved that the presidential election results be released “expeditiously” but this had little effect on ZEC which continued with its casual approach. Instead, ZEC proceeded to order a recount of votes in 23 constituencies, a recount that did not yield any material deviations from the original results.
After much agitation and mounting pressure from domestic and international stakeholders – including court orders and a job stayaway called by the MDC and discussion of the stalemate at the United Nations – the presidential election results were finally released on 2 May. According to the law, this result necessitated a second election “within 21 days of the previous election”, which ZEC interpreted to mean “21 days after the declaration of the results”. The electoral body stalled again by not immediately announcing the date for the new poll. Meanwhile, the main opposition MDC-T rejected the results, having previously declared that its candidate won an outright majority. By the time the results were announced, Tsvangirai had already skipped the country, fearing for his life. It is clear that the 29 March harmonised elections, far from producing harmonised results, generated much disharmony, which deepened with each passing day.
The Hellish Election
Meanwhile, all hell had broken loose. Soon after the results of the parliamentary elections, the whole of Zimbabwe was engulfed in a wave of politically motivated violence whose epicentre was in the rural areas. The post-March crackdown, allegedly orchestrated and systematically executed by state security agents in collusion with ZANU-PF militia and war veterans, included, but was not limited to, murder of opposition and suspected opposition leaders, intimidation, kidnapping, torture and arson in a campaign called “Mavhotera Papi” (Who did you vote for?). This strategy was designed to ‘soften’ the electorate ahead of the 27 June run-off election. A major humanitarian crisis arose, compounding an already tragic multi-layered crisis. By the time of the run-off, at least 100 innocent lives had been lost, thousands injured and over two hundred thousand people internally displaced. This inter-election period was one of the darkest episodes in the country’s history; it was a deeply traumatising era.
The scale of the violence and intimidation compelled Tsvangirai to withdraw from the election on 22 June, leaving Mugabe to run in a one-candidate election which he ‘resoundingly’ won by 86 per cent to Tsvangirai’s 9 per cent of the votes. Mugabe was again crowned the country’s president on 29 June, a few hours after the declaration of the victory. The election was dismissed as ‘a sham’ by virtually every credible observer group, including SADC, the African Union, and the Pan-African Parliament. There was consensus that the election was a travesty of democratic practice and a pale shadow of the March elections, and that it did not express the voluntary will of the people; it was an election without a choice.
Towards a Power-sharing Agreement
Mugabe’s electoral ‘victory’ deepened the protracted crisis and the SADC, AU and United Nations were all faces with this seemingly insoluble problem. Again, the onus for unlocking the logjam was placed on former South African president Thabo Mbeki’s shoulders. After intense negotiations, the mediation efforts produced the first fruits. On 21 July 2008 three political principals namely Mugabe, Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara – representing the splinter and smaller MDC formation – signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU provided a framework for dialogue among the three protagonists “with a view to creating a genuine, viable, permanent and sustainable solution to the Zimbabwean situation”.
After several weeks of difficult negotiations, a landmark agreement was struck on 11 September and was signed – with much fanfare – on 15 September 2008. The power-sharing agreement covers a wide spectrum of policy issues ranging from restoration of economic stability and growth to promotion of national healing, rule of law, freedom of assembly and association, depoliticisation of state institutions and the crafting of a new constitution.
The actual power-sharing is embodied in a new structure of government, whereby Mugabe remains Head of State and head of a 31-member cabinet. Tsvangirai becomes Prime Minister and head of a council of ministers. Both the cabinet and the council will comprise of 15 members from ZANU-PF; 13 from MDC-Tsvangirai; and another 3 from MDC-Mutambara.
For the average Zimbabwean, the signing of the PSA raised high hopes – though not euphoria – that, finally, the national nightmare would come to an end and that life for Zimbabweans would normalise again. But at the time of writing, a month after 15 September, the Agreement has not yet taken off the ground. Clearly there appears to be deep mutual distrust among the political gladiators, and on 9 October, 2008, Tsvangirai “declared a deadlock” in the dialogue for the allocation of government portfolios. Two days later, Mugabe unilaterally apportioned the 31 ministries, reserving for his party the juiciest and most powerful – including those responsible for the military, police, security, justice and information, and giving his rivals the lightweight portfolios. This again plunged the deal to the verge of collapse, with Tsvangirai dismissing Mugabe’s cabinet allocation as a “power grabbing” decision that “not even an idiot would accept”.
In the meantime, the country’s economy continues in its precipitous freefall and people are grievously hurting. The annual inflation rate for July 2008 skyrocketed from 11.2 million per cent in June to 231 million per cent. Steve Hanke of the Cato Institute estimates that as of 26 September 2008, “Zimbabwe’s annual inflation rate was 531 billion per cent”. The country is experiencing acute shortages of foreign currency, fuel, electricity, medicines, and basic food like mealie meal, milk and bread. Some 3 million people out of a population of about 13 million are said to have fled the country, a measure of its inhabitability. About 3 million Zimbabweans also urgently need food assistance and the figure will jump to 5 million by early 2009. Anxiety and skepticism are now enveloping the country regarding the future and sustainability of the power-sharing deal. There are now many unknowns about the Agreement.
Unanswered Questions
Even if the power-sharing deal were to hold, will it pull Zimbabwe from its deep economic and social abyss? Will it be the panacea for the social, political and economic ills that have been afflicting the country for the past eight years? Further, the Agreement has been attacked for being an elite pact that serves the interests of the power elite rather than the people’s interests. Can the country, whose industry and agriculture have been brought to their knees, afford 31 ministers and 31 deputy ministers? The deal has also been condemned for undermining the will of the people as expressed on 29 March. Is the power-sharing arrangement what the people really want? Given the history of party-based polarisation, do Zimbabweans have confidence that the proposed “inclusive government” will work?
These and many others are questions that crisis-weary Zimbabweans are now asking. Only time will provide answers to these questions. For now, the political elites are fidgeting while Zimbabwe is burning. This article was written to provide background information to the Zimbabwe PIW issue Zimbabwe Election 2008: some poets’ perspectives
© Professor Eldred Masunungure, Director of the Mass Public Opinion Institute in Harare
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